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Strategic Regional and National Economic Development
with Fiscal Equalization
Lok Sang Ho*

Abstract
This paper shows that under increasing returns, devoting resources to
develop some regions strategically ahead of other regions make sense, but
this does not imply that the other regions have to wait until the benefits of
economic growth to trickle down. Fiscal equalization can and should be
more aggressive, with the central government incurring a deficit to help
the poorer regions, and the national debt thus caused to be repaid by
higher taxes on the fast growing regions. Optimal fiscal equalization
should also involve central government’s investment in certain kinds of
public infrastructure in the local economies of the backward regions based
on social cost benefit analysis. China’s increasing regional income
disparity is therefore unnecessary.

1. Introduction
A developing country often faces the dilemma of whether or not to focus
its investment on some strategic areas that will produce the greatest returns.
To do so would risk ignoring the needs of some of the least developed
areas. But focusing on some areas first— particularly those industries with
large forward and backward linkages, has been recognized to be a sound
development strategy for a long time (Hirschman, 1958). Mr Deng
Xiao-ping, widely recognized as the architect of modern China, had
similarly recommended a strategy of “allowing a small portion of the
population to turn rich ahead of others.” Such a strategy would make
sense in a world with increasing returns to investment. Increasing returns
*
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means as you put into the system more and more input, the output gets
disproportionately bigger. Graphically, this means that instead of a
development possibility curve that is concave to the origin, as in Figure 1,
we would have, instead, one that exhibits convexity to the origin. If
increasing returns and decreasing returns co-exist, then we may have
convexity and concavity at the same time, as in Figure 2.
We assume a nation with two regions A and B. We assume that there is a
pool of “discretionary capital” that can be allocated between region A and
B and that all capital invested will be efficiently utilized. Two axes then
depict the present values of the income streams accruing to A and to B
associated with an investment strategy as represented by any point on the
development possibility curve. If there is no discretionary capital
allocated to A at all, development value will be “Min D for A”. If all the
discretionary capital is allocated to A, development will be “Max D for A.”
Similar interpretation goes for “Min D for B” and for “Max D for B.” In
Figure 1, with decreasing returns, the optimal strategy will be where the
“Development Possibility Curve” touches the highest 45 degree line.
In Figure 2 we assume there is increasing returns to investment over some
ranges. Increasing returns means that as more of the discretionary capital
is allocated to B instead of to A, at some point greater returns accrue to A
than is the sacrifice suffered by B. With increasing returns over some
ranges of the development possibility frontier, there are multiple local
optimums. However, between the local optimums K and Q, obviously the
present value associated with Q is bigger. So from the nation’s point of
view, B should be favored. At Q, the nation can maximize the present
value of development focusing more on developing B.
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Figure 1: Development Possibilities under Decreasing Returns
PV of Regional
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Decreasing Returns: Two Regions
Development Possibilities Frontier with
Present Values of Incomes Accruing to
Each Region(decreasing returns
assumed

Min D for A
PV of Regional
Development in B

Min D for B
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However, this does not mean that A has to suffer. Indeed, given the
higher present value of development it is possible to improve the welfare
of both Region A and Region B over what is possible if development
strategy K is adopted.
This will imply NOT ONLY some form of transfer payments to Region A,
BUT ALSO borrowing. But to the extent that the investment to B may still
take time to bear fruit, total disposable income in B today may not be high
enough to support the transfer. If in fact the investment is going to be so
profitable, however, so that incomes are going to rise in B due to that
investment, it should be possible to borrow to sustain a better living
standard in A as well as in B. There would be no need to wait till the
“trickling down process” benefit the backward region. The constraint of
course is that what is borrowed will need to be repaid and that the
investment has to be able to support the repayment of such borrowing.
What transpires from this analysis is that the central government may run a
deficit to help A, and repay the debt thus raised by taxing B harder in the
future.
2. Regional Disparity and Equalization in China
Now let us go back to the case of China. Region B is like China’s coastal
cities. Region B is like China’s inland provinces. In the 1980s China had
opened up in the first instance 14 cities and set up 4 Special Economic
Zones, giving them special status in terms of policy privileges. This
encouraged the inflow of investment into these regions, both from outside
China and from inside. At the same time, however, much of the inland
provinces did not enjoy the benefit of inflow of capital. However, many of
them did receive transfer payments from the central government.
According to Wang and Fan (2003), the central government had adopted a
fiscal transfer policy to redress the regional disparity between the eastern
and the western regions of the country from the 1950s. A large amount of
investment poured into the western provinces, but efficiency was low.
Then in the beginning of the economic reform period, the central
government tried to motivate provincial governments to improve efficiency
and reduced the tax intake from them. As a result, resources available for
4

transfers dwindled, while the eastern region spearheaded to new heights
every year. As a result disparity widened rapidly.
In 1980 the per capita GDP for the central and west regions were 65% and
53% of that of the eastern region. By 2000 these percentages had
dropped to 53% and 41%. As shown in Table 1, although fiscal
equalization did raise per capita disposable incomes, over the years the per
capita disparity in disposable income has not improved, suggesting that not
enough had been done by way of equalization payments. As long as the
greater returns from investment are real, the nation’s total wealth increases
instantly in terms of present value. This should allow inter-regional
transfers to benefit the unfavored region as much as the favored region.
Initially some borrowing may be necessary, but the borrowing can be
serviced as the returns from the investment kick in.
Table 1. Equalization Did not Improve Disparity over the Years
Region

1980

2000

2000/1980

Eastern Region
GDP per capita
(Benchmark normalized to 100)

100

100

1

Eastern Region
Disposable Income Per capita
(Benchmark normalized to 100)

100

100

1

Central Region
GDP/capita

65

53

81.5

Central Region
Disposable Income/capita

78

62

79.4

Western Region
GDP/capita

53

41

77.3

Western Region
Disposable Income/capita

70

54

77.1

Source: Wang and Fan (2003)
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3. Migration and the “Migrant Worker Model of Development”
The statistics in the previous section notwithstanding, the key income
disparity on the mainland is that between rural and urban residents. The
richest “regions” remain, of course, to be the big cities that lie at or near
the coast in the east of China. In the discussion below, we will focus on
transfers to the rural population, with the understanding that an effective
system of transfers to the rural population will benefit the “western region.”
Fiscal equalization is of course not the only means of “equalization.”
Another important means of equalization occurs when workers migrate to
the eastern region and derive an income there. The job opportunities have
been increased by the greater investment. Although GDP per capita is
higher in the cities, part of the incomes earned actually accrues to migrant
workers who can transfer their incomes back to their original locations.
Thus, “disposable income per capita” in the western region and in rural
areas in general is augmented not only by the public channel through fiscal
transfers, but also by the private channel through personal income transfers.
This pattern has been borne out by data supplied in the Wang and Fan
(2003) article.
It is estimated that some 200 million migrants are working in cities, but
they do not have household registration (hukou) in the cities and they are
discriminated against in employment, education, healthcare, and housing.
Concomitant to the migration of workers to the cities in the eastern region
of course is the loss of workers in the rural areas, especially those in the
western region. However, this is not a concern given the existence of
surplus labor in the western region. What is more important from the point
of view of developing the western region is for these poorer areas to have
more disposable incomes. Thus fiscal transfers and personal income
transfers potentially improve the quality of life in the western region.
In principle, wages in the cities in the eastern region has to be attractive
before workers in the rural areas would migrate. The attractiveness of
this model of development is that wages can be attractive to workers from
the west even though the meager wages cannot support a family living
where the work is and are therefore internationally competitive. This is
6

because the cost of living is much lower in the underdeveloped western
region, so that what may appear to be a low wage to city dwellers living
along the coast may still be very attractive to migrant workers. Some
figures will illustrate: according to the China Daily (May 16 2006) the
minimum wage in Beijing in 2004 was 545 yuan per month (US$67.2), just
20% of the city’s average income, while the minimum wage in Shanghai
stood at 635 yuan (US$78.2), about 25% of the city’s average income.
Researcher Liu Jun-sheng of the Income Research Institute of Labor and
Social Security, found that the minimum wage in 2004 in 25 provinces,
autonomous regions, and municipalities was less than local average
monthly living requirements. Clearly the jobs would only appeal to
migrant workers who came from locations where wages were much lower.
Without the migrant workers’ contribution China could not have been so
competitive. The availability of the migrant labor had allowed the eastern
region to develop much faster than otherwise,1 further contributing to the
increasing returns of infrastructure investment and investment in plant and
equipment. Fiscal transfers from the richer regions to the poor regions
where the migrant workers came from are therefore well justified.
4. Fiscal Transfers in the Face of the Household Registration System
Given China’s household registration (hukou) system, part of the fiscal
transfer may be in the form of a wage subsidy to those whose household
registration is in a rural, backward region, regardless of where the worker
works. Thus a migrant worker working in a city would get the wage
subsidy, just as a worker who stays behind in his village or his hometown
to work. To the extent that his registration is not in the city, we know he
is a migrant worker, and the subsidy will eventually find its way to help
sustain a higher consumption level in the rural areas.
Traditionally, the hukou system has effectively discriminated the migrant
worker because he normally will not have the social security and other
benefits that the city resident enjoys. Students without the requisite hukou,
for example, need higher marks at the university entrance examination in
order to get into university. While some changes are taking place
1

For example, average incomes in Beijing and Shanghai were rising at about 15% per year
from 1994 to 2004, when the China economy grew at 9.5% annual rate.
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recently: for example, in 2002, Shanghai launched an insurance scheme for
its migrant workers, and employers are required to contribute to pensions
for the workers as well as cover work-related injuries, and health insurance,
these do not involve public subsidies and in particular do not involve any
fiscal transfers. In view of the above analysis, wage subsidies from the
central government financed by taxes or future taxes on the more
prosperous cities for workers with rural hukou would make sense.
In recent years, there is increasing talk about eliminating the hukou system
in China (China Daily, HK edition, January 23, 2008). But there is
lingering worry over the risks associated with rapid population growth in
cities. For example, commenting over a proposal by Tsinghua University
professor Qin Hui for Shenzhen to set aside land to build low-cost housing
for low income people including migrant workers, Ge Hong,
Vice-chairman of Shenzhen Academy of Social Sciences, expressed
reservation.(April 16, 2008 China Daily) One possibility is that people
from the rural areas are allowed to change their hukou to the cities if they
so desire, but then they will have to give up the wage subsidy that is
designated for the rural residents.
5. Public Investment and Optimal Fiscal Equalization
China’s infrastructure investment relies both on government and private
inputs. For private investment in infrastructure, expected profitability is
crucial, and investors essentially derive returns from tolls and charges.
They are invariably attracted to the coastal areas where incomes are high
and economic growth is expected to be fastest. However, public investment
does not have to be commercially viable. As long as social benefits justify
the social costs, a project would be worthwhile. As long as no better
project comes along, the project under consideration should go ahead.
Optimal fiscal equalization requires not only an optimal amount of transfer
from the strategically favored region to the backward region but also an
optimal split between cash transfer and public investment. The former
implies moving along the 45 degree line from point Q up in Region A’s
favor until the marginal social benefit is equal to the marginal social cost,
where marginal social benefit = the benefit accruing to the people of
Region A and the marginal social cost = the loss suffered by the people of
8

Region B as the transfer takes place. The latter implies equalizing the
marginal benefit of today’s consumption and the marginal present value
benefit due to higher future consumption made possible by the public
investment.
One might think that cash transfer to the regional government allows the
greatest flexibility and so may promote efficiency better than public
investment. If the regional governments can be counted upon to
maximize the long term interest of the people of the region this conclusion
may well hold. However, the regional governments may have their own
agenda, and there may also be a pro-present-consumption bias due to what
is sometimes called hyperbolic discounting. 2
Under hyperbolic
discounting, when policy makers need to choose between two competing
projects, one of which brings in a more distant benefit stream than another
one, they tend to bias their choices toward the one that will bring more
immediate benefits. Postponing the benefits that are so close at hand is
perceived to involve a bigger sacrifice than postponing the benefits that
will accrue some years down the road. Hyperbolic discounting involves
applying different discount rates to different projects. If so when the
central government makes a transfer, it may require that a certain budget
be assigned for specific infrastructure investment that is based on
application of more objective cost benefit analysis, which would appear to
be more likely with the central government than with the local government.
To explain this we can refer to a growing literature on “hyperbolic
discounting.” In traditional cost benefit analysis, future benefit streams
and cost streams have to be discounted to the present and then compared to
assess if a project is worthwhile. Hyperbolic discounting says that the
annual rate of discount that applies to near-term benefits will rise
significantly as implementation gets more and more imminent.
Postponing a project that can bring immediate benefit by one year then is
perceived to entail a huge sacrifice— far larger than that associated with
postponing a project scheduled nine years away by one additional year, or
postponing a project that brings distant benefits. This can be explained
with the Figure 3.1 and 3.2.
2

Dasgupta and Maskin (2004) explained hyperbolic discounting as the tendency for decision
makers to increase the rate of discount as the time before payoffs are realized grows shorter
and shorter.
9

Figure 3.1: Total Perceived Benefits of Two Projects in Today’s Dollars
Present Values

Total perceived benefit in
today’s dollars for a “distant
benefit project”

Total perceived benefit in
today’s dollars for a “near term
benefit project”

Years postponed

Figure 3.2: Perceived MB and MC of Postponing One Project to Expedite Another

$ of MB or
MC
Perceived
MC of postponing a near
term benefit project

Perceived MB in terms
of bringing forward a
distant benefit project

Years postponed
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Figure 3.1 shows the perception about net benefits of two projects,
assuming the projects are implemented at different dates. It is assumed
that the project promising more distant benefits has higher net benefit than
the one promising nearer-term benefits. If the projects are postponed,
perceived net benefits decline for both projects, but for the project
promising immediate benefits, the value is discounted at a much higher
rate because of hyperbolic discounting.
Figure 3.2 shows the perceived marginal cost of postponing the near term
benefit project. It is assumed that the benefit of postponing the near term
benefit project is to bring forward the distant benefit project. Because of
hyperbolic discounting, which may be considered a weakness inherent in
human nature, the marginal cost of postponing the near-term benefit
project is much higher than that of postponing the distant benefit project.
So, even though the net benefit of the more distant project is higher, it is
postponed in favor of the one that brings immediate benefits.
A glaring example of this phenomenon is the tragedy in New Orleans in
the summer of 2005. Thus, Malanga of The City Journal wrote:3
today’s federal government isn’t smaller but ever-growing. Its
priorities, however, both parties have woefully distorted.
Increasingly, Washington neglects key projects (like shoring up the
New Orleans levees) in order to shower money on often-superfluous
projects that local congressmen favor— ranging from wildlife refuges
to tennis courts in rich communities to arts and folk festivals to a
long list of other inessential initiatives. This pork-barrel waste, not
smaller government, is what victimized New Orleans.
Actually, beyond pure hyperbolic discounting, which is largely a
perception problem and which has to do with the flaws of human nature,
there is an institutional bias that will produce what might appear to be a
result of hyperbolic discounting. Because the terms of office for elected
3

“Katrina and Pork: How congressional waste harmed New Orleans,” by Steven Malanga,
The City Journal, 17 October 2005. http://www.city-journal.org/html/eon_10_17_05sm.html
accessed September 22, 2007.
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politicians are limited, they naturally would like to give their constituents,
particularly those with influence, immediate benefits while they can.
Future tax burdens or other undesirable consequences that have yet to
happen are too distant for them to worry about. Malanga further
observed:
increasingly Congress uses the growing federal budget to serve the
narrow interests of its members, circumventing the traditional
budget process and skirting procedures for competitive bidding to
insert favored projects directly into appropriations legislation. The
process, euphemistically called earmarking, “has become so routine
and so pervasive . . . that what was once a boon for the most
powerful and favored has become an expected way for local
governments and other institutions to get aid from Washington,”
wrote the Congressional Quarterly last year.
Another major policy debacle that follows the hyperbolic discounting logic
relates to the massive failures of Savings and Loans during the early
1980s.4 Many observers believe that the under-funding of bank regulators
was one key reason behind the pervasive fraudulent practices in the
industry. Even though S&Ls were suffering from the upwardly spiraling
interest rates under Paul Volcker’s chairmanship of the Fed, and from an
asset/liability mismatch, the problems were greatly aggravated by fraud
(see Chapter 7). The “ultimate cost of the savings and loan crisis” was
estimated at some $160 billion (FDIC, 1997, p.169) At the time, Savings
and Loans were regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB), and its examination force was understaffed, inadequately trained,
and suffering from limited resources. A government-wide hiring freeze
in 1980 to 81 had compounded these problems. Such belt-tightening was
in part a result of the Reagan tax cuts,5 but taxpayers over the long term
lost far more than what they saved momentarily. Considering the major
social losses that have resulted from the behavior of short-sighted voters
and that of politically-savvy politicians, democracy does not come cheap.

4

The title of James R. Adams’ book is telling: The Big Fix: Inside the S&L Scandal: How an
Unholy Alliance of Politics and Money Destroyed America’s Banking System [1990]
5
The Reagan tax cuts were implemented through the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA)
of 1981 that embodied much of the Kemp-Roth bill providing a 25 percent across-the-board
cut in personal marginal tax rates.
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6. Conclusions
This paper argues that to optimize national economic development it
makes sense to focus investment where returns are greatest, and given the
prevalence of increasing returns, this tends to polarize incomes and
exacerbate regional disparities. However, we argue that it is actually not
necessarily to wait until the “trickling down process” gradually benefit the
backward regions. Instead, fiscal equalization, both through direct fiscal
transfers and supplemented by borrowing, as well as some infrastructure
development aimed mainly at boosting effective consumption of both
private and social goods, can benefit the backward regions immediately.
This argument is additional to the traditional argument for fiscal
equalization that is mainly based on regional differences in the gap
between fiscal capacity and public expenditures. (Boadway and Shah, 2006,
Chapter 2) Fiscal transfers can potentially reduce both the income gap
between the eastern and the western regions and that between rural and
urban populations.6
We have also demonstrated that devoting more resources to develop B first
does not mean that A has to suffer in the near term. If the present value
of development is truly maximized for the nation, then the nation can
afford to borrow more so as to boost Region A’s near term consumption,
even as more of the discretionary capital is allocated to develop B first. If
the provincial government is more prone to “hyperbolic discounting”, then
it may also be desirable for part of the fiscal transfer to be designated on
certain kinds of infrastructure investment that may have higher present
values but have a benefit stream that is less “front loaded” as others.
The fiscal transfers would generally imply a short-term fiscal deficit in the
central government, which will be repaid from higher taxes on the richer
provinces. Thus optimal fiscal equalization is not confined to
contemporaneous transfer of incomes, but also may imply higher future tax
intake from the regions enjoying increasing returns and rapid growth, and
it may be in the form of a wage subsidy for those with hukou in the
6

Urban townships enjoyed a 10.4% in per capita disposable income to reach 11759 yuan,
while rural residents had only a 7.4% increase to reach 3587 yuan in 2006. (Mingpao, January
26, 2007) The percentage increases reported have netted out inflation effects. Yuan figures
are nominal.
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backward areas, as well as in the form of infrastructure investment in such
items as roads, water supply, electricity, schools, and hospitals. This is how
the backward regions can benefit immediately without having to wait for
the trickling down effects to arrive. According to Chen Xiwen, director
of the office of the central leading group on rural work, the Central
Government will increase its budget for rural investment by more than
25% to 520 billion yuan in 2008 (China Daily HK edition, Feb. 22, 2008).
This is a step in the right direction, and is well justified in view of the
arguments in this paper.
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